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 This paper proposes that reforms by vote-seeking governments and the 
existence of reform-adverse voters are logically compatible. This results from 
a commitment problem on the part of voters. Due to economic voting voters 
cannot credibly commit to reelect a non-reforming government during a 
recession. The empirical implication of this voter commitment mechanism is that 
governments only adopt visible welfare-program reforms during economic 
lows, which is what the empirical political-economic literature has established.  
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1. Introduction 
Governments often do not adopt reforms that economists consider efficiency 
enhancing. However, when governments take up such reforms, they typically 
do it during economic downturns or economic crises. For 21 OECD-
countries between 1975-2003, Høj et al. (2006) find that economic crises are 
associated with higher overall reform activity. Here economic crises were 
defined as an output gap larger than 4%, while reform activities included both 
labour market and product market reforms (see  also Pitlik and With, 2003).  
 This paper adds to the comparative welfare state literature and the 
political economic literature on reform by proposing a mechanism that 
explains both the occurrence and the timing of reforms in welfare-programs. 
Whereas there exists much political-economic literature about the 
commitment problem of politicians, the mechanism here, which we call voters’ 
commitment problem, instead derives from the commitment problem faced by 
voters. We present a simple game-theoretical model that formalizes how 
economic voting makes voters unable to commit to reelect a government that 
will not reform during economic hardship. This voters’ commitment problem 
makes that vote-seeking governments are only willing to consider reform 
when they know they will likely be voted out of office anyway amidst the 
economic hardship. Consequently, an electorate that opposes reform and a 
government implementing reform are reconcilable. The central empirical 
implication is that reforms take place during economic downturns only.2
 The argument we present hinges on three underlying assumptions. The 
first is that reforms are unpopular among most voters. Boeri et al. (2002) 
indeed find in a survey of the opinions on pension reform in Germany and 
Italy that citizens oppose reform. Moreover, Brooks and Manza (2006) show 
that most policy preferences are in favor of welfare-programs (see also Boeri 
et al., 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Becker, 2005). Finally, Van 
Groezen et al. (2009) find that especially the desire to remain at the status quo 
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induces voters to be weary of pension reforms, even if these might improve 
their financial position.  
 A second assumption is the imminence of economic voting; that is, 
citizens – correctly or not – blame their government for weak economic 
performance (Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1979; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). There 
is a widespread consensus in the literature that economic voting is ‘a 
generalized phenomenon in industrial democracies’ (Pacek and Radcliff, 1995: 
44; see Van der Brug et al., 2007). Powell and Whitten (1993) find a mediating 
effect of the clarity of political responsibility. In majority systems, in which it 
is clear who is politically responsible, voters are more likely to vote 
retrospectively (that is economically) than in systems with lower degrees of 
clarity. Examples of the latter are minority governments or parliamentary ones 
(see also Whitten and Palmer, 1999).  
 A final assumption is that government is first and foremost vote-seeking, 
but can also be rent- or policy-seeking. Both approaches are non-controversial 
and standard in the literature. Governments make a trade-off between 
remaining in office by adopting a policy that voters want and adopting a 
policy that they want themselves for some reason (“rent-seeking”). In 
particular, when facing sure electoral defeat they turn policy-seeking (or rent-
seeking), as winning office is no longer possible. 
 As both voters and politicians are rational and forward-looking in our 
model, the argument offers a rationalization of the occurrence and timing of 
reforms and thereby does not depend on bounded rationality or irrationality 
of any actor, which is not to deny that this may be relevant.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss the 
comparative welfare state and political-economic literature on reforms and 
argue that this literature does not adequately account for the occurrence and, 
especially, the timing of reforms. Next, we introduce the game-theoretical 
model. We end with some concluding remarks. 
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2. Related literature 
When does reform occur? That is to say, what is its timing? The answers put 
forward in the comparative welfare state literature and the political-economic 
literature on reform do not fully explain the timing of reforms, as we discuss 
now.  
 
2.1 Comparative welfare state research3
 A first body of comparative literature on the welfare state argues that 
the main cause for pressure on the welfare state – and thereby for reform – is 
socio-economic change and the ensuing problem load (Rodrik, 1997; Garrett 
and Mitchell, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2001; Iversen, 2005). 
Theoretically, this argument makes sense. For example, if population ageing is 
projected to lead to budgetary problems, it is likely that the government will 
take measures to try and deal with the issue. However, the socio-economic 
account provides little theoretical footing as regards when exactly such 
measures are taken. When do governments pursue cutbacks that may be 
necessary, but which are also electorally risky? 
 
 A second perspective on welfare reform focuses on political struggles, 
sometimes integrating socio-economic variables too. The argument is that the 
variation in the degree and type of welfare state reform is influenced by the 
partisan complexion of the government (e.g. Ross, 2000a; Korpi and Palme, 
2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004) or by the dynamic of party competition (e.g. 
Kitschelt, 2001; Green-Pedersen, 2002). While offering useful insights into 
some of the factors that hinder or facilitate reform, this account cannot 
explain when governments engage in electorally risky activities. Why, for 
example, have unpopular measures been taken by some right-wing and by 
some left-wing governments in Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, but 
not by others (see Vis, 2009)?  
 5 
 A third body of comparative welfare state literature focuses on the 
influence of institutions. The usual argument is that countries with the least 
institutional hurdles, and therefore the highest degree of power concentration, 
should display the highest degree of welfare reform. Consequently, reform 
should be higher in Westminster countries than in political systems with a 
high level of power fragmentation (like Switzerland and the US). Several 
empirical studies support this hypothesis (e.g. Bonoli, 2001; Swank, 2001). 
However, some authors note that the reverse relationship is also plausible (see 
Ross, 1997). Political systems concentrating political power also concentrate 
political accountability. As a result, ‘(…) voters know very well who they may 
blame for unpopular cutbacks’ (Starke, 2006: 109). In political systems where 
power is fragmented, conversely, avoiding blame for unpopular measures is 
easier (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1994), which may result in more retrenchment. 
The institutionalist approach has been helpful for explaining the cross-
national variation in welfare reform. It cannot explain the when of reform as 
governments in the same country face the same institutional constraints and 
opportunities (Armingeon et al., 2005).  
 A final strand of literature proposes that ideas matter for welfare state 
change. The argument here is that by invoking a specific discourse or 
imperative, governments may overcome the hindrances to change and 
successfully implement reform (Cox, 2001; Schmidt, 2002; Stiller, 2007; see 
Campbell, 2002; Lieberman, 2002). But when will this happen? According to 
Ross (2000b: 173), this is most likely when the ‘(…) underlying ideas, frames 
and policy structures are not wildly incongruous with new initiatives’. Studies 
focusing on the importance of ideas have added to the knowledge of the 
process of welfare reform. However, this literature offers little theoretical 
foothold as regards when ideas matter (see Lieberman, 2002).  
 Klitgaard (2007) offers a partial solution to the question of when reform 
occurs by arguing that Social Democratic parties in universal (Social 
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Democratic) welfare states pursue market-oriented reforms when the party 
elite considers the policy problems to be a threat to the welfare state’s 
legitimacy. However, this explanation cannot be generalized to other type of 
parties or types of welfare regimes, as it premises on the assumption that the 
universal welfare state is a power resource for Social Democratic parties. 
   
2.2 Political economy of reform 
 Next we discuss political-economic literature on reforms. Selén and 
Ståhlberg (2007) posit that the pension reform in Sweden, which gradually 
transformed the public defined-benefit pension system into a so called 
notional defined contribution one, could be implemented successfully because 
the reform would benefit a majority of the voters. Adopting a political-
economic perspective, they argue that the winners who would vote in favor of 
the reform outnumber the losers who would vote against it, accounting for 
the reform. The underlying assumption that voters know ex ante, and with 
certainty, if they are a winner or loser of the reform is problematic. For most 
voters, pension systems are complex – to say the least. Calculating the present 
value of expected pension benefits and expected contributions in the old and 
the proposed new system is something that surely goes well beyond the 
capacities of the ‘average’ voter (see Boeri et al. 2002).  
 In a recent political-economic contribution, Kemmerling and Neugart 
(2009) propose that countries in which financial markets are politically 
powerful – measured by among other things the degree of assets held by 
institutional investors as a share of GDP – are more likely to pursue pension 
reform that increases the private savings component. The reason is that 
financial markets have an interest in such reforms, as they typically manage 
defined-contribution schemes. Although this argument is plausible, it fails to 
account for the large-scale pension reform that included a shift toward 
defined-contribution in, for example, Sweden (Selén and Ståhlberg, 2007), as 
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the financial market of that country is comparatively weak (BIS, 2007).  
 
3. A new mechanism: Voters’ commitment problem 
We propose a new mechanism, voters’ commitment problem, to account for the 
timing of welfare-program reforms that is applicable to democratic systems. 
The trust of the argument is that due to economic voting voters cannot 
commit to reelect a government that will not reform when the economy is in 
a poor state. Due to this commitment problem, reforms take place during 
economic lows only.  
 This mechanism differs from political-economic explanations that focus 
on the failure of reform. This literature has often assigned this failure to the 
‘nonneutrality’ in the distribution of gains and losses in society. Reform is 
non-neutral because the winners from the status quo are assumed to be 
politically strong, whilst the losers are politically weak. Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) expand the argument, stating that it is the uncertainty about the 
distribution of gains and losses that impedes reform. If some of the winners 
and losers of the reform cannot be identified ex ante, the status quo is likely to 
prevail. While this argument offers a convincing account of the conditions 
under which reform does not occur, our mechanism examines the conditions 
under which it does.  
  Elections come with a pre-election commitment problem on the part of 
politicians, as they cannot commit themselves to actually implement the plans 
they propagate during elections. When in office, they may use their power to 
break the election promise with the voters. The crucial aspects of elections, 
the ability to ‘throw the rascals’ out at the next election, partly solves this 
commitment problem. There is however a similar commitment problem 
between elections on the side of the voters. This problem results from 
economic voting. Voters generally oust a government during an economic 
recession, because they blame politicians for it. Due to the omnipresence of 
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economic voting, the promise to do otherwise in the absence of reform is 
therefore not credible. The pledge of the representative voter before elections 
to reelect the government if it refrains from a reform is therefore not 
believable and certainly not enforceable. Therefore a vote-seeking government 
might reform during a recession, as a reform does not influence the prospect 
of reelection. The only consideration for the government is whether they 
intrinsically support the reform in the first place. For several reasons this may 
be the case. A government may be in favor of a reform because it thinks it is 
efficiency-enhancing, because it has an ideological preference, or because of 
rents provided by minorities in favor of the reform. The following game 
formalizes the argument. 
 
3.1 The game 
 There are three players in the game: two identical politicians and one 
representative voter. The two identical politicians both have a time-additive 
utility function, Vt, with a felicity function U(xi) which is concave and positive 
and where xi represents consumption at time i. The discount rate is β. The 
utility-function at time t is given by:  
 
∑∞= −= ti itit xUV )()(β  
 
At each point of time one and only one politician holds office. If a politician 
is out of office, he (or she) does not have any decision to make and his utility 
is normalized to 0. If the politician is in office he receives a positive 
endowment w>0. 
  For both the politician in office and the voter, the following stage 
game enrolls: 
1. There is a move by nature that determines economic circumstances. With 
probability λ economic circumstances are good, with probability 1-λ they are 
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bad. 
2. Next, the politician can choose between two actions. The first is to reform, 
the second is to stick to the status quo with no reform. In the case of reform, 
the politician receives, next to w, a positive amount r>0. This may be 
interpreted as his personal benefit of reforming, in the form of rents or 
ideological satisfaction. It may also be interpreted as an efficiency gain, 
internalized by the politician (and not internalized or not understood by the 
voters). 
3. After observing the state of the economy and the action of the politician, 
the representative voter has the option to either reelect the politician or not. If 
the politician is not reelected, the other politician is automatically elected. The 
graph depicts the sequence of the stage game where the (re)installment of the 
new government at t=4 closes the stage game. 
 
=Graph 1 here= 
 
The preferences of the voter are such that he prefers no reform to a reform 
under any circumstance. 
 The action space of the politicians consists of two actions, reform and 
no reform. The action space of the voter also consists of two actions, 
reelection or no reelection.  
 We restrict the strategies and the equilibria of the players in several ways. 
First, we only consider pure strategies. Second, we restrict attention to 
Markov equilibria. In Markov equilibria, actions of players are a function of 
the current, pay-off relevant state. Here the state is defined as the state of the 
economy (either good or bad). This rules out that agents condition their 
actions on the entire economic history or the history of others agents’ actions. 
Third, as the two politicians are identical we only consider symmetric 
equilibria where both politicians have the same strategy. 
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 For the politician a strategy maps the state of the economy into the 
action reform or no reform. A strategy thus consists of a pair that prescribes the 
action when the economy is in a bad and good state respectively. The voter 
has a strategy that maps the economic condition and the action of the 
politician into the action reelection or no reelection. Therefore the strategy of 
the voter has to prescribe an action in four circumstances, conditional on the 
state of the economy (either good or bad) and on the action of the politician. 
  
3.2 Equilibria with perfect conditioning 
 First, the situation is considered where the voter can condition 
reelection perfectly on the occurrence of reform. So, economic circumstances 
are not relevant in this case. Then, the voter has the optimal strategy to reelect 
a politician that does not reform and does not reelect a politician that reforms. 
Subsequently, there are two potential pure strategy equilibria, one with both 
politicians always reforming and one with both politicians never reforming.  


















           (i) 
The left-hand side gives the immediate gain of reforming compared to not 
reforming. The right-hand side gives the difference of the remaining lifetime 
utility of never reforming and the lifetime utility of always reforming (given 
that the other politician always reforms). In the latter case both politicians are 
in office every second period and reform when they are. Under condition i, 
given that the other politician always reforms, it is best to do likewise. As the 
two politicians are similar, this constitutes a Nash-equilibrium. Note that if 
β=0, the condition is always met, as r>0. In that case, future income is not 
considered at all and reforming is more attractive. 
 Another possible equilibrium is one with both politicians not reforming. 
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<−+             (ii) 
Note that if β=0, the condition is never met. This condition states that - given 
that the other politician never reforms- never reforming and hence holding 
office forever after, leads to higher life-time utility than reforming once and 
never being (re)elected again.  
Summarizing, there are three possibilities.  
1. U(w+r)-U(w) is small and condition ii is met and condition i is not met. This 
means that lifetime utility of always holding office is large. Reforming is not 
attractive, even if the other politician does likewise. The equilibrium with both 
politicians never reforming occurs. 
2. U(w+r)-U(w) is large and condition i is met and condition ii is not. Utility of 
even a one time reform is large and there will always be reform. In that case 
there is no way for the voter to discipline the government by not reelecting 
him.  
3. U(w+r)-U(w) has an intermediate value and both condition i and ii are met; 
then both equilibria are possible. Which one will occur depends on the ability 
of the two politicians to coordinate the equilibrium of both of them 
reforming. That equilibrium will provide both politicians with a higher 
lifetime utility than the equilibrium where both never reform. If the politicians 
indeed succeed in coordination, a further strategy of the voter could be to 
never reelect one of the two politicians once he reformed and to always 
reelect the other one, irrespective of him reforming or not. With such a 
strategy of the voter, the politician the strategy is aimed at will not reform. 
 Note that it is not possible that both conditions are not met, as the 
right-hand side of condition ii is larger than the right-hand side of condition i. 
 
3.3 Equilibria with economic voting 
 We now turn to the case where the voter can only condition reelection 
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imperfectly on the action of the politician in office. As an extreme case of 
economic voting, the politician is never reelected when the economy is 
slowing down, irrespective of whether he reformed. This constitutes the 
commitment problem of the voter who cannot credibly commit to reelecting 
a government that does not reform. Consequently, the politician will always 
reform during a recession. For the politician reforming does not alter the 
prospects of being reelected while there is a positive pay-off r>0. During 
booms, a politician is still never reelected after a reform, as before.   
 Again, two equilibria are possible. The appendix shows the following 
necessary condition for an equilibrium where both politicians will not reform 


















rwUrwUwUwUrwU            (iii) 
Note that condition iii reduces to condition ii if λ=1. In that case economic 
circumstances are always positive and the voter can perfectly condition 
reelection on the actions of the politicians. Note also that if β=0, the 
condition never holds; in that case the future is not taken into account by 
both politicians and they will therefore always reform. 

















   (iv) 
Note that, as before, condition iv reduces to condition i if λ=1. Note also that 
if β=0, the condition always holds.   
 The appendix shows that the right-hand side of condition iii is larger 
than the right-hand side of condition iv. Therefore it is not possible that both 
conditions are not met and there is always at least one equilibrium. 
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 Generally, there are again three possibilities. A unique equilibrium with 
both politicians always reforming, a unique equilibrium with both never 
reforming during booms or the possibility that there are two equilibria. Which 
one occurs in the latter case, depends on which one the two politicians 
coordinates. The equilibrium where both reform has higher life-time utility 
than the one where neither reforms. This follows from the observation that 
condition iii is met and it is then better not to reform than to reform, given 
that the other politician does not reform. Condition iv is also met, implying 
that it is better to reform than not to reform, given that the other politician 
reforms. Generally it holds that not reforming when the other reforms gives a 
higher lifetime utility than not reforming when the other does not reform. In 
both cases, the politician has the same income when in office and is only out 
of office after bad economic circumstances. In the latter case however the 
probability of coming back into office is smaller, as the other politician does 
not reform during booms. Combining these observations, it holds that in the 
case of multiple equilibria, the two politicians have higher lifetime utility in the 
equilibrium of both reforming than of both not reforming. For the voter the 
opposite holds; the equilibrium with both not reforming provides higher 
lifetime utility.  
 
3.4 Comparative statics 
 We investigate the comparative statics to assess how the willingness to 
reform and the ability of voters to discipline politicians is influenced by the 
four different parameters in the model.  
 
=Table 1 here= 
 
 It can be shown that, ceteris paribus and for all w, condition iii will more 
likely be met when the base wage w increases, that is the right-hand side 
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increases more than the left-hand side. If the wage increases, reform is less 
likely to occur. This follows as reform leads to the loss of the base salary w in 
the next period and possibly subsequent periods. The higher this loss is, the 
less likely a government is to reform. This implies that higher income for 
government members decreases the probability of reforms during prosperous 
economic times. The opposite holds for condition iv; the higher is w, the less 
likely the condition is met and the less likely is an equilibrium with both 
reforming. 
 Furthermore, ceteris paribus and for all r, condition iii will less likely be 
met when rents r increase; then the right-hand side decreases more than the 
left-hand side. The higher is r, the more likely reform will be. This formalizes 
that higher rents of reform make its undertaking more attractive. The 
opposite holds for condition iv; the higher is r, the more likely the condition is 
met and the more likely an equilibrium with both reforming is. 
 For both conditions, the comparative statics of λ and β are not 
straightforward. The partial derivative of the bound can be both positive and 
negative. The sign depends on the particular values of the parameters and the 
functional form of the utility function, making general predictions of the 
effect impossible. 
    
4. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the coexistence of vote-seeking governments pursuing 
unpopular welfare-program reforms and reform-averse voters are 
reconcilable, a finding that helps solve a theoretical puzzle in the literature on 
such reforms. In line with for example Høj et al. (2006), the empirical 
implication of our theoretical model is that reforms, if at all, are initiated 
during recessions. Our contribution lies in presenting the theoretical 
mechanism, which is that the occurrence and timing of reforms springs from 
an intrinsic commitment problem of voters in times of economic recession. 
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Due to economic voting, there is a high chance that the incumbent party or 
parties will not be re-elected, irrespective of their particular policy. 
Subsequently, other considerations to reform come to forefront for 
governments, which may then undertake a reform. These other factors 
include rents, ideology or a genuine wish to implement efficient policies.  
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2 Note that our argument focuses on visible welfare reforms. The argument 
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combined might have a large impact.  
3 This section draws heavily on Vis (2009). 
4 Here and in the remainder of the paper, the familiar convergence result of a 




























                                                                                                                                     
The Appendix 
 
This appendix derives some results given in the main text. 
 
Derivation of equation iii 
Equation iii gives the condition for the equilibrium where both politicians do 



















To derive this condition, assume the first of the two politicians does not 
reform. It is best for the second politician to do likewise if, given the first 
politicians’ strategy, the life-time utility of no reform is at least as high as that 
of always reforming. 
 If the second politician reforms during good times, he has utility U(w+r) 
when in office and is then voted out. When out of office he will at one point 
be back in office, he also has a positive life-time utility at the beginning of the 
next period when still out of office, denoted here Uout. Uout can be determined 
in a recursive manner: 
outoutout UUrwUU βλββλ +++−= ])()[1( 2  
With probability 1-λ economic circumstances will be bad, and the other party 
will be voted out. Then the politician will be back in office within one period. 
Otherwise, he remains out of office which provides lifetime utility of Uout the 
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If the second politician does not reform during good times, he has utility U(w) 
and he stays in office. This gives lifetime utility  
inUwU β+)(  
It remains to determine Uin. This can be determined with the following two 
equations: 
])()[1(])([ outinin UwrUUwUU βλβλ ++−++=                             
inoutout UUU βλλβ )1( −+=                                                                        
 
Here Uin and Uout are the lifetime utility of entering the stage game while 
being in and out of office respectively. When a politician is currently in office, 
he faces a probability λ that economic times will be good. If so, he receives 
both his wage w and he remains in office, which offers again the prospect of 
Uin the next period, discounted by β. With a probability 1- λ economic times 
will be gloomy, in which case he will reform and thus receive w+r. In the next 
period he will be out of office, and has the prospect of Uout, discounted.  
 
















This gives an expression for Uin in terms of Uout. Using this: 
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Derivation of condition iv 
















    
Given that the other politician reforms, it is best to do likewise during a boom 
if the life-time utility of reform is at least as high as that of not reforming 
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during booms. If the politician also reforms, he has U(w+r) immediately and 














When the politician does not reform he receives utility U(w) and stays in 
office. Denote the lifetime utility of being in office Uin and of being out of 
office Uout. These can be determined by solving the following two equations 
that recursively define both: 
])()[1(])([ outinin UwrUUwUU βλβλ ++−++=  
inout UU β=  
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Right-hand side of condition iii larger than that of condition iv 







































































First note that:   
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+ . The derivative of 
right-hand side with respect to λ equals zero, whereas the derivative of the 
left-hand side is proportional to β(1-β)2>0. Therefore the left-hand side is 
larger than the right-hand side for all 0<λ<1. As this holds for all 0<β<1, the 
inequality follows. 
 From this inequality the original condition would follow if r=0. When 
















it follows that the right-hand side decreases faster in r than the left-hand side. 
Therefore the condition also holds for any r>0. 
 
 
 
 
